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11 Baumol’s cost disease
James Heilbrun
In 1966, William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen published Performing
Arts: The Economic Dilemma. Their book was extraordinarily influential
and it is generally agreed that analysis of the economics of the arts had its
origin in that work.
The economic dilemma Baumol and Bowen referred to was the problem
of financing the performing arts in the face of ineluctably rising unit costs.
These, they argued, are the result of ‘productivity lag’. The resulting cost
pressure has come to be known as ‘Baumol’s cost disease’. Productivity is
defined by economists as physical output per work hour. Increases in pro-
ductivity over time may occur for the following reasons: (1) increased
capital per worker, (2) improved technology, (3) increased labour skill, (4)
better management, and (5) economies of scale as output rises.
As this list suggests, increases in productivity are most readily achieved
in industries that use of a lot of machinery and equipment. In such indus-
tries output per worker can be increased either by using more machinery or
by investing in new equipment that embodies improved technology. As a
result, in the typical manufacturing industry the amount of labour time
needed to produce a physical unit of output declines dramatically decade
after decade. The live performing arts are at the other end of the spectrum.
Machinery, equipment and technology play only a small role in their pro-
duction process and, in any case, change very little over time.
That is not to say that technological improvements are entirely absent.
For example, stage lighting has been revolutionized by the development of
electronic controls and audience comfort greatly enhanced by air condi-
tioning, which also facilitates longer seasons and more flexible scheduling.
But these improvements are not central to the business at hand. As Baumol
and Bowen point out, the conditions of production themselves preclude
any substantial change in productivity because ‘the work of the performer
is an end in itself, not a means for the production of some good’ (ibid.,
p.164). Since the performer’s labour is the output – the singer singing, the
dancer dancing, the pianist playing – there is really no way to increase
output per hour. It takes four musicians as much playing time to perform
a Beethoven string quartet today as it did in 1800.
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The productivity lag argument 
The productivity lag argument can be summarized as follows. Costs in the
live performing arts will rise relative to costs in the economy as a whole
because wage increases in the arts have to keep up with those in the general
economy even though productivity improvements in the arts lag behind. It
is not suggested that artists must be paid the same hourly wage as workers
in other jobs, since working conditions and the non-monetary satisfaction
obtained from employment differ across occupations. Rather, the argument
is that all industries, including the arts, compete to hire workers in a nation-
ally integrated labour market and that artists’ wages must therefore rise
over time by the same proportion as wages in the general economy to enable
the arts industry to hire the workers it needs to carry on.
Of the five sources of increased productivity cited above, only economies
of scale as a result of longer seasons is really effective in the live perform-
ing arts. With only that factor to rely on, the live performing arts, as
Baumol and Bowen emphasized, ‘cannot hope to match the remarkable
record of productivity growth achieved by the economy as a whole’ (1966,
p.165). As a result, cost per unit of output in the live performing arts is fated
to rise continuously relative to costs in the economy as a whole. That, in
brief, is the unavoidable consequence of productivity lag.
A hypothetical example
In Table 1 we compare two industries, the widget manufacturing industry
in which productivity rises steadily, and the symphony concert industry in
which it is stagnant.
The widget manufacturer
Output per work hour (opw) is measured by widgets produced per worker
per hour. We assume that it rises from 20 widgets in 1990 to 24 in 2000, an
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Table 1 Hypothetical illustration of productivity lag
1990 2000 Change (%)
Widget industry
Output in widgets per work hour (opw) $20 $24 20
Wage per hour (w) $10 $12 20
Unit labour cost (ulc) per widgetw/opw $0.50 $0.50 20
Symphony orchestra
Output, measured by admissions per $2 $2 20
work hour (opw)
Wage per hour (w) $20 $24 20
Unit labour cost (ulc) per admissionw/opw $10 $12 20
increase of 20 per cent. Wages rise at the same rate as productivity, going
from $10 per hour in 1990 to $12 per hour in 2000. Unit labour cost (ulc)
equals wages per work hour divided by output per work hour. In 1990, ulc
equals $10/20 widgets, or 50 cents per widget. In 2000, unit labour cost is
unchanged. Though wages have risen 20 per cent, so has output per work
hour, leaving ulc still at 50 cents per widget. Thus wages in a progressive
industry can rise as fast as productivity without causing any increase in
costs.
The symphony orchestra
To explain and quantify output per work hour for a symphony orchestra,
we make the following assumptions:
Size of concert hall1600
Concerts per week5
Potential admissions per week516008000
Number of musicians100
Musicians’ work hours per week40
Orchestra hours per week100404000
Orchestra output per work hour (opw)admissions per week divided by
orchestra hours per week8000 divided by 40002.
As to wages, we assume musicians are paid $20 per hour in 1990. By the
year 2000 musician wages have risen 20 per cent, to $24 per hour, in order
to keep pace with rising wages in the general economy. Unit labour costs,
which equal wages per hour divided by output per work hour, therefore rise
from $10 to $12. Thus unit labour cost rises by the same proportion as pro-
ductivity lags.
Historical evidence on costs
The historical record strongly supports the hypothesis that, because of pro-
ductivity lag, unit costs in the live performing arts have increased substan-
tially faster than the general price level. Baumol and Bowen (1966) provide
abundant examples, pieced together from remarkable historical sources.
Using a set of account books for the Drury Lane and Covent Garden
theatres in London covering the years 1740–75, Baumol and Bowen calcu-
late that the average cost per performance came to an estimated £157 in the
five-year period 1771–2 to 1775–6. For the sake of comparison, they esti-
mated that the average cost per performance at the Royal Shakespeare
Theatre in 1963–4 stood at £2139, or 13.6 times its eighteenth-century level.
Over the same period (1771–2 to 1963–4) the general price level in England
rose to about 6.2 times its initial level. Thus ‘the cost per performance over
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the period as a whole went up more than twice as much as the price level’
(ibid., p.183).
The above conclusion is based on the comparison of costs of two differ-
ent organizations at two points in time. Baumol and Bowen were also able
to measure the change in costs within a single organization over a long
period. For the New York Philharmonic Orchestra they put together a
nearly continuous cost history covering 1843 to 1964. Over that period cost
per concert rose at a compound annual rate of 2.5 per cent while the US
index of wholesale prices rose an average of only 1.0 per cent per year (ibid.,
p.186).
For the years after World War II, they analysed data on 23 major US
orchestras, three opera companies, one dance company, and a sample of
Broadway, regional and summer theatres. Table 2 shows that in every group
the results were the same: cost per performance rose far faster than the
general price level.
An international comparison
Baumol and Bowen also found that their evidence, although rather sketchy,
did support a conclusion that the problem of productivity lag is interna-
tional in scope. In the theatres they investigated in Great Britain in the
1950s and 1960s, ‘cost per performance rose at a rate of 7 to 10 percent
while prices went up at about a 4 percent rate’ (1966, p.201). In the USA,
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Table 2 Growth in expenditure per performance and in the wholesale price
index, postwar period, USA
Average annual percentage
increase (compound rate)
Organization Period Expenditure per Wholesale
performance price index
23 major orchestras 1947–64 3.1 1.3
Metropolitan Opera 1951–64 4.4 0.3
City Center Opera 1958–63 2.0 0.0
New York City Ballet 1958–63 2.3 0.0
Theatres:
Broadway sample 1950–61 6.0 1.4
Regional theatre A 1958–63 11.2 0.0
Regional theatre B 1958–63 6.0 0.0
Regional theatre C 1955–63 2.5 0.9
Summer theatre 1954–63 3.6 0.0
Source: Baumol and Bowen (1966, Table VIII-3, p.199).
‘Costs rose during the postwar period at an annual rate close to 4 percent
while prices went up between 1 and 2 percent’. Thus the ratio was roughly
2 to 1 in both countries, suggesting to the authors that the problem of pro-
ductivity lag ‘knows no national boundaries’ (ibid., p.201).
The earnings gap
From the beginning, Baumol and Bowen were concerned about the finan-
cial implications of productivity lag for performing arts firms. The princi-
pal implication, as they saw it, was that, because of productivity lag, costs
would rise ineluctably. Revenues, having no built-in growth mechanism,
would necessarily lag behind, and the earnings gap would grow continu-
ously.
At this point we must define some terms. The absolute size of the earn-
ings gap equals expenditures less earned income. Its relative size equals that
amount as a percentage of earned income. Since non-profit firms generally
cannot run an operating deficit, the gap must be approximately covered by
unearned income. The amount of unearned income is therefore another
measure of the gap.
In the foreword to Baumol and Bowen’s book, August Heckscher, direc-
tor of The Twentieth Century Fund, which had financed its publication,
wrote: ‘It is not only that the live performing arts do not pay for themselves,
but that, within the developing economic system, they will show deficits of
increasing size’ (1966, p.vii). Indeed, a whole chapter of the book is devoted
to ‘Trends in the Income Gap’ and the final chapter, entitled ‘Prospects’,
deals with little else. Moreover, the authors found evidence of a growing
earnings gap not only in the USA and Great Britain, but also in Italy and
Sweden.
On the basis of postwar experience, Baumol and Bowen estimated that,
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, expenditures of performing arts firms
would rise between 5 and 7 per cent per year while earned income would
rise only 3.5 to 5.5 per cent yearly, resulting in continued relative (as well as
absolute) growth of the gap. Fortunately, that did not happen. Expend-
itures continued to increase rapidly, but in some art forms earned income
rose as fast or faster, so that the gap in some areas declined in relative size.
Data from a Ford Foundation study (for which Baumol was a consultant)
show that, from 1965–6 to 1970–71, the gap as a percentage of total expen-
ditures rose for symphony orchestras and non-profit theatres, but fell for
opera, ballet and modern dance companies (Ford Foundation, 1974,
pp.388–93). A study by Samuel Schwarz and Mary G. Peters (1983) indi-
cated that, in the 1970s, the relative size of the gap fell substantially in
ballet, modern dance and non-profit theatre, declined slightly for sym-
phony orchestras, and was approximately stable for opera.
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More recent data gathered by Marianne Felton (1994), indicate that the
gap continued to decline into the early 1990s, except in the field of modern
dance (see Table 3). It should be noted that in Great Britain a study by
Peacock, Shoesmith and Millner of the performing arts in the 1970s found
no evidence of the cost disease in that decade. Apparently, the extremely
high rate of inflation in those years induced performing arts companies to
adopt cost-reducing policies that temporarily halted the operation of the
cost disease (see Towse, 1997b, p.351).
On the whole, then, dire predictions that productivity lag would lead to
a relentlessly increasing earnings gap proved to be incorrect. A number of
factors can work to offset the effects of productivity lag. In this instance
expenses of performing arts companies did increase more or less as pre-
dicted, but earned income rose at an equal or slightly higher rate, so the rel-
ative size of the gap began to decline. What explains the rise in earned
income? Apparently, ticket prices rose much faster than the general price
level without causing a drop in attendance. (I say ‘apparently’ because we
have no summary measure of ticket price movements.) As a result, box
office revenues, adjusted for inflation, rose substantially. Thus productivity
lag in the arts persisted, but so did some of its potential offsets.
Interpreting the earnings gap
Something more must be said by way of interpretation. Schwarz and Peters
point out that, since performing arts firms in the non-profit sector cannot
normally operate with a cash deficit, an earnings gap cannot exist unless
unearned income is available to cover it. Emphasis on the earnings gap as
the starting point in a financial analysis leads one to think of unearned
income as a passive factor that responds after the fact to the financial needs
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Table 3 The earnings gap: contributed income as percentage of total
revenue
Sample Beginning Ending
size year (%) year (%) Change
Symphony orchestras 39 1972 36.4 1992 35.4 1.0
Operaa 24 1981 48.7 1991 46.2 2.5
Ballet 7 1983 36.6 1992 34.2 2.4
Modern dance 6 1983 43.0 1992 56.1 13.1
Non-profit theatres 39 1980 38.0 1992 38.1 0.1
Note: aexcluding the Metropolitan Opera.
Source: Felton (1994).
of the company. But one could just as well look at it the other way around
and argue that the existence of unearned income makes it possible for a per-
forming arts firm to finance expenditures in excess of earned income. A
very large earnings gap for a given firm might indicate, not that the firm is
in serious financial trouble, but rather that it has succeeded in finding gen-
erous outside support, probably in response to its very high quality of oper-
ation.
Is there an ‘artistic deficit’?
Faced with the continual upward pressure on costs generated by productiv-
ity lag, firms in the live performing arts might be expected to seek ways of
economizing by gradually altering their choice of repertory or their pro-
duction process. For example, theatrical producers might look for plays
with smaller casts or plays that could be mounted with a single rather than
multiple stage sets. Or they might try to compensate for higher costs by
shunning artistically innovative plays that do not draw well at the box office
and so have to be ‘carried’ by revenues from more conventional offerings.
Orchestras and opera companies, too, might be driven away from innova-
tive or ‘difficult’ material by box office considerations. Or, operating on the
cost side, they might select programmes with an eye to reducing rehearsal
time or hire fewer outside soloists or other high-priced guest artists.
Although experience clearly teaches us that firms will respond to rising
input costs by economizing in the use of the offending inputs, economists
interested in the arts are likely to be disturbed when they find firms in the
performing arts doing just that. They are offended at the notion that
Hamlet is no longer viable because its cast is too large, or that piano con-
certos will be less frequently heard because soloists have become too expen-
sive. When that occurs it has been said that performing arts firms are
reducing their fiscal deficit by incurring an ‘artistic deficit’.
It is worth noting that this problem is peculiar to the performing arts. In
the fine arts – for example, in architecture – we fully expect practitioners to
adapt their ‘products’ to changes over time in the relative prices of alterna-
tive inputs. We are not surprised to find that modern buildings are devoid
of the elaborate hand-carved stonework that decorated important build-
ings in earlier times. Indeed, the aesthetic rationale of the modern move-
ment in architecture was precisely to design buildings that could use
machine-finished materials in place of the increasingly costly hand-finished
ones. In this instance it is not too strong to say that the necessity of adapt-
ing was the challenge that gave rise to a whole new school of design.
What makes the performing arts different is that the past provides much
of the substance that we want to see performed. We do not want Hamlet
with half the characters omitted because of the high cost of labour. Nor do
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we wish to give up symphony concerts in favour of chamber music recitals
simply because symphonies employ too many musicians. We want the range
of ‘artistic options’ to include the option of hearing or seeing performances
of great works that were invented under very different economic circum-
stances than our own. There would indeed be an artistic deficit if today’s
companies became financially unable to present for us the great works of
the past.
Have our performing arts institutions, responding to financial pressure,
already begun cutting back along some dimensions of quality? Are we even
now the victims of an artistic deficit? Some of the evidence is what social
scientists call ‘anecdotal’, but there is systematic evidence, as well. Table 4
reproduces data from a study by the Baumols showing that average cast size
for all non-musicals produced on Broadway fell from 15.8 in 1946–7 to 8.1
in 1977–8. More recently, this author has shown that, from 1983 to 1998,
companies have produced popular operas at the expense of new or less well-
known works, which could be interpreted as evidence of a growing artistic
deficit in the field of opera (Heilbrun, 2001, pp.63–72).
Income from the mass media in the USA
Some years ago it was suggested that performing arts firms might be able
to earn income from the mass media to help relieve the financial pressure
generated by productivity lag. Symphony orchestras, to pick the most
obvious example, might be able to earn royalties from the sale of record-
ings. Theatre, ballet, and opera companies, in addition to earning royalties
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Table 4 Cast size of broadway plays
Broadway season Average cast size
1946–7 15.8
1953–4 14.4
1957–8 13.4
1962–3 12.4
1967–8 8.9
1972–3 10.2
1977–8 8.1
Note: As a result of printing/editing errors, table 11 did not actually appear in the cited
source. It is used here with the permission of the authors.
Source: Baumol and Baumol (1985), ‘The Future of the Theater and the Cost Disease of
the Arts’, in Mary Ann Hendon, James F. Richardson and William S. Hendon (eds), Bach
and the Box, a special supplement to the Journal of Cultural Economics, Akron: Association
for Cultural Economics, table 11.
from the sale of pre-recorded tapes or videodiscs, might be paid for perfor-
mances on broadcast or cable TV. After all, in the analogous case of pro-
fessional sports, earnings from television far outweigh income from ticket
sales.
Unfortunately, this potential revenue never materialized. Royalties are
trivial for most US symphony orchestras, and the trend has been down.
(See the evidence cited in Heilbrun and Gray, 2001, pp.148–50.) Nor did
performing arts companies ever earn significant income from television
performances. In the early days of commercial television, the networks
made a modest effort to present high culture on the tube. But as time went
by and public television became increasingly important, the commercial
networks virtually abandoned cultural programming to the public stations.
A commercial market for culture on TV no longer exists.
In assessing the prospect that the mass media might at some future date
become heavy purchasers of performing arts material, there is further bad
news: Hilda and William Baumol have shown that programme production
costs on television are subject to inflation on account of productivity lag
for exactly the same reasons as costs in the live sector are (Towse, 1997a).
Thus the same cost problem that bedevils live production of the perform-
ing arts reappears to limit the prospect of substantial sales to the mass
media.
Baumol’s good news
The problem of productivity lag exists only because there is persistent tech-
nological progress in the general economy which causes a rise in output per
work hour and in real wages, in other words a rise in per capita income,
which, in turn, increases the demand for the arts. In the case of the live per-
forming arts, that means the demand for tickets increases: at any given price
level the public will be willing to buy more tickets than it did previously.
Thus, while productivity lag causes ticket prices to rise, which will lead to a
decline in quantity demanded, rising income to some extent offsets that
effect by stimulating ticket purchases. This does not mean that productiv-
ity lag causes no problems, but only that rising living standards work to mit-
igate them. Perhaps an analogy is in order. Because of productivity lag in
the business of high-quality food preparation, the price of a meal in a
gourmet restaurant has risen sharply in recent years. That probably causes
a good deal of anguish to both customers and owners, but it has not pre-
vented the gourmet restaurant business from growing. A similar effect is
likely in the live performing arts. Baumol and Bowen were criticized for
failing to emphasize that possibility, but Baumol has corrected that failure
in a more recent paper (Baumol, 1996, pp. 183–206).
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Productivity lag does not justify subsidies
The hypothesis that productivity lag is bound to cause a long-run increase
in the real cost of the performing arts was often cited by arts advocates as
a justification for public subsidies. Without subsidies, it was asserted, either
ticket prices would have to rise continuously, which would end all hope of
reaching new audiences, or else performing arts companies would face
increasingly large deficits that would force many of them out of business.
Leaving aside the fact that there are some alternatives to these gloomy pre-
dictions, it must now be emphasized that productivity lag per se does not
provide justification for government subsidy. Productivity lag is a market
process that would cause unit cost to rise in any technologically unprogres-
sive industry. But there is no reason to subsidize an industry simply because
it is technologically unprogressive. On the contrary, given that its real costs
are rising relative to those in more progressive industries, it is best to let
its prices increase to reflect the rise in real costs. As long as markets are
operating efficiently, those higher costs will be absorbed optimally by the
economy. We would all be better off if there were no technologically unpro-
gressive industries, but, since there are, matters are made worse, not better,
if we use subsidies to prevent market prices from reflecting their true costs.
Lag or no lag, subsidies can be justified only by some form of market
failure.
Indeed, economists have written extensively about market failure, and
Baumol and Bowen discuss the rationale for public support of the perform-
ing arts in Chapter XVI of their book. But this is not the place to enter into
that large and complicated subject.
See also:
Chapter 10: Ballet; Chapter 17: Costs of production; Chapter 44: Opera; Chapter 45:
Orchestras.
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